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SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER
CHOICES
BENJAMIN FERGUSON∗, FLORIAN OSTMANN†
Abstract: We consider a case where consumers are faced with a choice
between sweatshop-produced clothing and identical clothing produced in
high-income countries. We argue that it is morally better for consumers
to purchase clothing produced in sweatshops and then to compensate
sweatshop workers for the difference between their actual wage and a fair
wage than it is for them either to purchase the sweatshop clothing without
this compensatory transfer or to purchase clothing produced in high-income
countries.
Keywords: Sweatshops, Exploitation, Compensation, Consumer Ethics
1. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice has decided to buy a new t-shirt. While shopping, she
finds two stores selling t-shirts she likes. The shirts on offer are identical
in their physical appearance, but differ significantly in their production
history. The first store belongs to a brand whose entire production takes
place in the US. Labelling its products as ‘sweatshop free’, the company
prides itself on the fact that the workers producing its garments work
under conditions that meet US health and safety standards and earn
what, according to the company’s marketing, is a ‘fair wage’. The second
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store, in contrast, belongs to a retail clothing brand whose products are
manufactured in Bangladesh, in factories that have been described as
typical of ‘sweatshops’. Garment workers in these factories are exposed
to significant health and safety risks and are employed at wages that have
been widely criticized as unfairly low.
In addition to the difference in production history and, at least in part,
as a reflection of it, the t-shirts also differ in their retail price. While the
‘fairly produced’ t-shirt has a price of $20, the ‘conventional’ t-shirt is
being sold for $5. Both of these prices are within the limits of what Alice
is generally prepared to pay – that is, we will assume Alice’s reservation
price for a new shirt is at least $20. Of course, like other consumers, Alice
has a ceteris paribus preference to pay less rather than more for her new
t-shirt. At the same time, however, Alice is motivated to take into account
moral considerations in deciding which shirt to buy. But how are the
options available to Alice to be evaluated from a moral point of view? As-
suming that Alice is going to purchase one or the other of the two products
just described, what is the morally best course of action for her to pursue?
In this paper, we consider three salient responses to the choice faced
by Alice and assess the normative force of these responses in different eco-
nomic contexts. Section 2 introduces the three options, which we call the
compensatory, instinctive and dismissive options and provides a rationale
for thinking that the compensatory option is morally superior to the other
alternatives. In Section 3, we consider four questions that have some bear-
ing on which option is morally best. In Section 4, we consider the scope of
Alice’s obligations as a consumer, the rights of workers, and discuss the
implementation of the compensatory option. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. THREE OPTIONS
According to a common response, it is morally best for Alice to purchase
the fairly produced t-shirt made in the US. Sweatshops, on this view,
are morally objectionable because the wages paid to those who work
in them are unfairly low. By purchasing the t-shirt made in the US,
Alice avoids relying on the sweatshop labour used in Bangladesh to
produce the conventional t-shirt and ensures that the workers who
produced the shirt she buys have been fairly compensated. Call this
course of action the ‘instinctive option’.
Some philosophers and many economists have dismissed this
response, arguing that the case for the instinctive option fails to give
adequate weight to the welfare interests of sweatshop workers (Krugman
2016). More specifically, opponents have pointed out that ‘sweatshop
labor often represents the best option available for desperately poor
workers to improve their lives and the lives of their family’ (Powell and
Zwolinski 2011: 449). Empirical data support this assessment. To take
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a particular example, in 2000, annual per capita income in Nicaragua
was ‘about $470’, yet at that time, garment workers at Chentex [a
subcontracted garment firm] could earn between $700 and $900 per
year, a significant difference in income that generated high demand
for sweatshop jobs (Ross 2004: 117). On a broader scale, the shift of
manufacturing jobs from high income countries to developing and lower
income countries has significantly reduced global poverty. For example,
between 2010 and 2015, Chinese per capita disposable income increased
182% in rural regions and 166% in urban areas.1 These considerations
provide a basis for a second response, namely, that it is morally best
for Alice to purchase the conventional t-shirt. Assuming that sweatshop
wages are indeed unfair, this option, unlike the instinctive option, will
fail to ensure that the workers who produced Alice’s t-shirt have been
remunerated fairly. (As we discuss later, proponents of this option may
question the assumption of unfair wages.) This, however, does not affect
the rationale for this option which concerns the welfare effects associated
with Alice’s choice. In particular, defenders of this option rely on the
assumption that demand for the conventional t-shirt contributes to the
availability of sweatshop jobs in Bangladesh. Workers there stand to gain
a significantly greater amount of welfare from these jobs, compared to
their next best option, and to be significantly worse off without them
compared to the American garment workers manufacturing the fairly
produced t-shirt. Furthermore, in addition to the immediate welfare
gains for individual workers, the growth of the manufacturing sector in
developing countries can have important economic ‘ripple effects’ leading
to more widespread welfare gains across society. Call the purchase of the
conventional t-shirt the ‘dismissive option’.
The justifications of these two responses appeal to two values that are
opposed in Alice’s options. The first is a concern for fairnesswith regard to
the remuneration of theworkers that produced the t-shirts. The second is a
concern for thewelfare effects of Alice’s decision. Fairness andwelfare both
represent important values. Moral theories that place an absolute weight
on either generate implausible prescriptions for many cases. Those that
give some weight to each value nevertheless remain contentious, in part
because they must justify these weights. Insofar as, along the lines just
described, the choice between the instinctive and the dismissive options
involves a trade-off between fairness and welfare, determining whether
the instinctive option is morally better than the dismissive option, or
vice versa, would require taking a position on the weighing of these two
1 According to Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, between 2010 and 2015 per capita rural
disposable incomes increased from 5919 CNY (US$ 857) to 10772 CNY (US$ 1560) and
urban disposable incomes increased from 19109 CNY (US$ 2767) to 31790 CNY (US$ 4603).
Data from China Statistical Yearbook 2010 and 2015.
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important values. There is a third course of action, however, that does
not require taking a position on the relative importance of fairness and
welfare. Like the instinctive option, this third option provides a way to
ensure that the workers who produce Alice’s t-shirt receive a fair level of
remuneration while also supporting the welfare-based considerations that
provide the rationale for the dismissive response.
Choosing what we call the ‘compensatory option’, Alice could
purchase the conventional t-shirt and, through separate channels, provide
a monetary transfer to the workers involved in the production of the
t-shirt that compensates them for the difference between their actual
wage and a fair wage for the relevant unit of production. We call this
difference δ. The transfer of δ would ensure that the concern for fairness
that motivates the instinctive response is satisfied. At the same time, this
course of action would send the same signal of demand for garment
products made in Bangladesh as the dismissive option andwould provide
greater welfare to workers who are relatively poor than the dismissive
option. It is thus weakly superior to the dismissive option in terms of its
welfare effects.
There are, of course, further options available to Alice that are
conceivable in this example. However, the dismissive and instinctive
options represent the most salient actions for most consumers. Most
consumers will either purchase one shirt or the other. The compensatory
option provides a straightforward alternative within the domain of
consumer behaviour that is, at least prima facie, morally superior to
the two alternatives. However, the plausibility of its moral superiority
depends on a number of assumptions, which we examine in the following
section.
3. FOUR OBJECTIONS
Here we consider four threats to the claim that the compensatory option
is morally better than the other alternatives: are sweatshop wages really
unfair, can the transfer of δ fully compensate workers for the wrongs they
experience in sweatshops, does the transfer of δ undermine existing wage
levels, and finally, would the pursuit of the instinctive option as a form of
boycott be more successful?
3.1. Are sweatshop wages unfair?
Advocates of the dismissive option may defend their position by
challenging the assumption that the sweatshop wages in our scenario are
unfair. If the wages were fair, then δ – the difference between the actual
wage and the fair wage –would be $0 and the compensatory optionwould
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not represent a distinct course of action.2 The purchase of the t-shirt made
in Bangladesh and the purchase of the t-shirt made in the US would be
equivalent in terms of fairness, but welfare-based considerations would
seem to speak in favour of purchasing the t-shirt made in Bangladesh.
Our description of Alice’s choice is meant to represent a fictitious
case, albeit one that does not depart too far from reality. Whether wages
paid by existing sweatshops are unfair depends on the empirical facts
that characterize individual cases and on the criterion that is assumed to
determine whether a given wage is fair. Without wishing to defend any
specific empirical claims about existing firms, we think that, insofar as
there are theoretically sound fairness criteria, it is likely that some factories
violate these criteria, while others may comply with them, as stipulated by
the description of the Bangladesh and US based factories in our scenario.
The more fundamental issue is whether there are plausible accounts of
fairness that apply in the context of wage labour.
Transactions are bilateral exchanges in which cooperative behaviour
generates a utility surplus to be distributed between the transactors,
where utility is a measure of the transactors’ preferences. Suppose Alice
wants Bob to clear snow from her property and Bob wants Alice’s money
in exchange. The more Alice pays Bob, the less utility she receives and, at
her reservation price (say $20) she gains no net utility from the shovelling.
The less money Bob gets for the work, the less utility he receives. At his
reservation price (say $10) he gains no net utility from the transaction.
These price points define the range of mutually beneficial transactions
that are possible between Alice and Bob. The set of all mutually beneficial
transactions is called the contract curve.
The notion of fairness implicit in the instinctive response is one of
distributive fairness. If a transaction is distributively unfair, then theremust
be some distribuendum that is maldistributed and a distributive criterion
that specifies how the distribuendum should be distributed.We argue that
any plausible account of fair transactions should employ a distribuendum
and distributive criterion that pick out a fair price that lies on the contract
curve. Suppose a particular theory picks out a fair price that lies off the
curve – perhaps a fair price for Bob’s shovelling is $25. Since $20 is the
most Alice is willing to pay, the transaction will not occur. This outcome is
worse for both parties since there are a number of transactions (all on the
contract curve) that both prefer to not transacting. Were Alice to pay Bob
$25, the transaction would cease to be a mutually beneficial transaction
and instead would be a form of exchange that makes Alice worse off and
Bob better off (in terms of preference satisfaction) than the status quo. By
2 Alice may still engage in a transfer of additional funds to the workers that produced her
t-shirt, and her doing so may be morally desirable, but such a transfer would no longer be
motivated by considerations of transactional fairness.
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FIGURE 1. (Colour online) Alice and Bob’s bargaining problem.
locating the ‘fair’ price off the contract curve a theory would not provide
an account of how a jointly generated surplus should be distributed,
instead requiring a transfer to Bob at a net loss to Alice.
Limiting candidates for a fair price to prices on the contract curve
excludes many proposed accounts of fair transactions. For example, basic
needs approaches claim that transactions are unfair if they fail to ensure
that the parties’ basic needs are met (Sample 2003; Snyder 2008). However,
if the terms that would ensure the transactors’ basic needs are met
lie beyond one transactor’s reservation price, then a fair transaction is
infeasible (Ferguson 2016). The same problem confronts accounts that
conceive of fair prices in terms of costs of production, for example (Reiff
2013).
One approach to conceiving of fair transactions that respects the
contract curve constraint is to model transactions as two person
cooperative games, or bargaining problems. Bargaining problems are
characterized by each agent’s status quo utility (n); the agents’ utility
functions, which define a set S of Pareto improving points; and a solution
concept, a function mapping the feasible set and status quo to a point in S.
Figure I below models the snow shovelling case as a bargaining problem
(assuming linear utilities, for the sake of simplicity) where Alice’s utility is
on the horizontal axis, Bob’s is on the vertical axis, and n is the utility each
receives if no transaction occurs. We know that Alice’s reservation price is
$20 and Bob’s is $10. Thus, S is bounded by n and the utility each receives
at these prices. The red frontier represents the contract curve.
There is a large literature of proposed solutions to bargaining
problems between rational agents. The most prominent ones include
the Nash (1950) solution, the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solution
and the egalitarian solution (Kalai 1977). When interpreted as criteria of
fair division, these solution concepts provide substantive accounts of fair
transaction. According to these substantive accounts, whether a price is
fair depends on whether it conforms to a particular bargaining outcome
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S026626711800010X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 89.99.183.211, on 18 May 2018 at 06:14:24, subject to the Cambridge Core
SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CHOICES 7
stipulated by a distribution criterion. For example, the egalitarian criterion
claims that a transaction is fair when the minimum gains of both parties
are maximized ($15 in the example above).
The substantive approach can be contrasted with procedural accounts
that claim that any outcome can be fair, provided the way the outcome
is reached is consistent with certain procedural conditions (Zwolinski
and Wertheimer 2016). Such procedural accounts have been developed
by Hillel Steiner (1984, 1987, 2010; Ferguson and Steiner 2018) and John
Roemer (1982), for example. Steiner’s takes the form of an historical
account, according to which a transaction is unfair if one party receives
less and the other party more than they would have received otherwise,
due to the occurrence of a prior injustice.
It is not our purpose here to provide a full account and defence of
a particular theory of transactional fairness. Rather, we merely wish to
point out that there are possible theories that satisfy the contract curve
constraint and that may plausibly support the claim that sweatshopwages
are unfair.
3.2. Can δ fully compensate sweatshops’ wrongs?
The second assumption is that the unfairness that characterizes the
treatment of the workers producing the conventional t-shirt can be
compensated by the transfer of δ. Our discussion so far has assumed
that δ is to be conceived of as the difference between workers’ de facto
wages and the wages they would receive under fair terms of employment.
It may be objected that this interpretation ignores the working conditions
under which the conventional t-shirt is produced.3 Sweatshops may be
bad in non-pecuniary respects. If this is so, and if pecuniary and non-
pecuniary wrongs are incommensurable, then a transfer of money, via δ
cannot compensate for these non-pecuniary wrongs. For example, Matt
Zwolinski has argued that ‘the concept of exploitation is best understood
in terms of actual or threatened rights-violation’, and that ‘the case can
be made that sweatshops wrongfully exploit their workers in other [non-
pecuniary] ways. Specifically, ...various forms of psychological and/or
physical abuse on the part of sweatshop managers’ (Zwolinski 2007: 710).
These concerns raise two issues, the first is whether non-pecuniary and
pecuniary forms of unfairness are commensurable; the second concerns
the moral status of compensations for rights violations.
3 On a broad understanding, ‘working conditions’ may be taken to include workers’
remuneration. In the following, we use the term in a narrow sense to refer to aspects of
the terms of employment other than wages. The possibility of conceiving of wages and
working conditions as being part of the same ‘compensation package’ remains unaffected
by this narrow understanding of the term. See Zwolinski (2007) for a discussion of this
possibility.
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3.2.1. Commensurability. The existence of non-pecuniary wrongs threat-
ens the moral superiority of the compensatory option. If the transfer of δ
fails to compensate for these non-pecuniary deficiencies, there would at
least be one respect in which the instinctive option was superior to the
compensatory option. Let us assume that a plausible conception of fair
terms of employment not only includes a certain level of wages, but, in
addition, working conditions that comply with certain health and safety
standards and other moral demands. If health and safety standards or
other aspects of the working conditions in the factory that produces the
conventional t-shirt fall short of what workers are entitled to, the transfer
of δ, while making up for the shortfall in wages, would do nothing to
address any of these other violations. Given that the t-shirt made in
the US, by assumption, is produced under fair working conditions, it
may be objected, the compensatory option would thus be inferior to the
instinctive option as far as considerations of fairness in relation to the
production of the t-shirt being purchased are concerned.
While this objection is initially attractive, it fundamentally turns on
the question of whether violations of all kinds of workers’ entitlements
can in principle be compensated through monetary transfers. If they can,
the objection is easily dismissed by adjusting δ so as to include the relevant
monetary amount required to compensate for any unfairness in working
conditions, in addition to the amount that corrects for the shortfall in
wages. This would ensure that the compensatory and the instinctive
options are equivalent as far as all aspects of fairness in relation to the
production of the t-shirt being purchased are concerned. If, in contrast,
the working conditions in the production of the conventional t-shirt
were characterized by deficiencies that are thought to be incommensurable
with monetary benefits, this would indeed lead to the conclusion that
the two options are not morally on a par. This conclusion would not
necessarily undermine the view that the compensatory option is morally
superior all things considered. Since the welfare effects associated with the
compensatory option would remain unaffected, its ranking on the welfare
dimension could outweigh the shortcomings as far as compensation for
violations of fairness are concerned. However, determining the overall
moral betterness relation between the two options would, in this case,
require attaching moral weights to different values.
The issue of commensurability of working conditions and monetary
benefits raises intricate questions (Ferguson 2018). For example, it might
be suggested that, at least when it comes to aspects of working conditions
whose alteration involves costs to employers, these are best thought
of as part of workers’ overall compensation package and that what
matters, as far as fair terms of employment are concerned, is the
monetary value of this overall package, regardless of the particular ‘mix’
of wages and working conditions that workers enjoy. Compensation
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for any form of unfairness through monetary transfers would be
straightforward in this case. The relevant compensatory amount would
simply be the difference between the actual wages plus the costs
associated with actual working conditions on the one hand, and the
monetary value of the overall compensation package towhichworkers are
entitled.
In light of the possibility that large reductions in health and safety
risks may come at comparatively low costs, however, the suggestion
that fair terms of employment are defined by the monetary value of
workers’ overall compensation package ultimately seems implausible. As
an alternative, it may be suggested that at least on the condition that
the mix reflected in a given compensation package is morally acceptable,
any combination of monetary compensation and working conditions
that falls on the same indifference curve as far as workers’ preferences
are concerned should be considered morally equivalent. On this view,
there would equally be no issue concerning the compensability of unfair
working conditions through monetary transfers, although the cost of
providing compensation for unfair working conditions may, depending
on the shape of the indifference curve, differ significantly from the cost of
providing fair working conditions directly.
Determining points of moral equivalence between working condi-
tions and amounts of monetary compensation on the basis of workers’
preferences seems to have some plausibility for certain aspects of working
conditions, such as the length of the working day, for example. Whether
all possible combinations of working conditions and wages that lie on the
same indifference curve can be considered morally equivalent, or whether
there is any defensible alternative basis for trading off deficiencies in
working conditions, is less clear. Extreme risks to life, for example, may
be thought to be non-compensatable through monetary transfers.
Even if there are certain working conditions that are incommensu-
rable with wages, there is at least a large range of cases in which it
seems plausible to assume that full compensation could be achieved. In
other cases, an all-things-considered ranking between the compensatory
and the instinctive option will depend on the relative weight assigned to
the avoidance of uncompensated violations of fairness in the treatment
of the workers that produced Alice’s t-shirt on the one hand and the
possible superiority of the welfare effects associated with the pursuit of
the compensatory option.
3.2.2. Rights. There is a second worry about the ability of δ to
compensate that arises even if working environments and wages are
fully commensurable. Workers plausibly have rights to fair compensation
packages and it seems unlikely that the violation of a right followed by
compensation is morally equivalent to the non-violation of a right. For
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example, on most theories of rights, Alice’s right to bodily integrity not
only gives her a moral claim against Bob’s hitting her without consent, it
also makes it impermissible for him to do so while compensating Alice
for the assault, even if the compensation leaves her as well off as she
was before the assault. Similarly then, if workers have rights to particular
compensation packages, the wrong of denying them these particular
packages cannot be fully mitigated by the subsequent transfer of δ, even
if it leaves them as well off as they would have been.4 Despite the transfer
of δ, at least within a rights-based framework, there will be a ‘moral
remainder’.
The crucial question is whether this threatens our claim that the
compensatory option is morally superior to either the instinctive or
dismissive options. If sweatshops violate workers rights, then even if the
transfer of δ leaves a moral remainder, compensation is surely morally
better than non-compensation. Thus, the compensatory option remains
better than the dismissive approach. Whether it is also morally superior
to the instinctive approach depends on the weight of the moral remainder.
If the degree to which δ mitigates the wrong of sweatshop labour is
insignificant, then one might conclude that the instinctive option is
morally better than the compensatory option. We think this conclusion
is implausible.
First, there is at least one reason to think that the dismissive option
is morally superior to the instinctive option, namely that sweatshop
workers – those whose rights are being violated – would prefer
Alice’s selection of the dismissive option to the instinctive option. If
the dismissive option is better than the instinctive option, and the
compensatory option is better than the dismissive option, then by
transitivity, the compensatory option is also better than the instinctive
option. Whether the dismissive option is all things considered better than
the instinctive option is a position we do not wish to take a stand on here.
We only note that for those who do believe it is, there is strong reason
to think the moral remainder cannot undermine the superiority of the
compensatory option.
There is a second reason to think that the moral remainder does not
threaten the moral superiority of the compensatory option. At the point
when Alice faces a choice between the three options, the violation of
workers’ rights has already occurred. Although Alice is to some degree
complicit in the plight of sweatshop workers (a point we discuss in
Section 4), her ability as an individual consumer to stop firms from
offering unfair compensation packages is limited. Given these two facts,
the best she can do to remedy this wrong is to compensate workers by
transferring δ.
4 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point.
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In summary, it seems that in some cases δ cannot fully compensate for
the unfairness experienced by sweatshopworkers. However, the existence
of a ‘moral remainder’ does not change the fact that the compensatory
option is morally better than the dismissive option. And it is difficult to see
how any ‘moral remainder’ left after compensating workers by δ can be
sufficiently weighty to make the compensatory option less morally good
than the instinctive option. The compensatory option remains the morally
best course of action for consumers in most cases.
3.3. Does δ adversely affect wage levels?
Even if δ can fully compensate unfairness, the case for the compensatory
option faces practical hurdles if its effect on agents’ economic incentives or
firms’ responses to the transfer undermine its promised benefits. The third
question is thus whether the compensatory option can actually deliver a
benefit to sweatshop workers.
This question is similar to debates about minimum wage legislation,
a policy option that has received a great deal of attention as a possible
response to sweatshops. Yet, while similar in certain respects, the pursuit
of the compensatory option differs in its implications from minimum
wage legislation in important ways. Since the compensatory transfer δ
is directly linked to workers’ labour, it functions as a subsidy to wages
provided by the consumer. Thus δ can always reach workers regardless of
firms’ behaviour.5
Nevertheless, the transfer of δ may still affect wage rates. If workers
were willing to provide labour at wage rates that did not include the trans-
fer (call this rate ω), then they will also be willing to provide their labour
if the firm reduces their contribution to workers’ take home pay to ω − δ.
In such a case, the transfer would fail to provide workers with economic
gains, since wages of ω − δ from the firm, plus δ from the consumer simply
equal ω. If the compensatory transfer has no effect on worker income,
consumers’ desire for ethically produced shirts will remain unsatisfied
and they will stop making compensatory transfers. The equilibrium
strategy would be for consumers to refrain from transferring δ.
However, there is an additional possibility: firms may capture a
portion of δ, while allowing workers to retain some as well. The
introduction of this strategy provides a new (and Pareto superior)
subgame perfect equilibrium in repeated versions of the game shown
below. The consumer’s choice to subsidize is represented by δ, firms’
choice to capture all of δ by A, none of δ by N, and to split  by S. Let
5 The difference between minimum wages and the compensatory transfer is that in the
former case firms are legally required to pay more and so may respond by decreasing their
demand for labour, while in the latter case labour is being subsidized which could lead
firms to lower wages while being able to command the same amount of labour as before.
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FIGURE 2. Subsidy capture.
the payoffs represent proportions of δ. The payoff from splitting may take
a range of values, with consumers’ proportion of δ represented by x, firms’
by 1 − x, where 0 > x > 1.
Firms know that if they choose A in the first iteration (or enough early
iterations) of the game, consumers will lose faith and will choose ¬δ in
later iterations. Consequently, firms will not choose A. Firms also have no
incentive to select N. Thus, firms will choose S. Knowing that firms will
choose S, consumers will choose δ. But what value of xwill firms select? If
consumers cared only about the absolute value of δ that reaches workers,
then the equilibrium value for x would be very low. Firms would only
need to pass on more of δ than they would in consumers’ next best option,
¬δ, to make strategy S attractive. Yet, in the context of sweatshop compen-
sation, it is plausible to assume consumers’ motivations aremore nuanced.
The explicit goal of δ is to mitigate maldistributions between firms
and workers. If consumers are also concerned about the proportional
distribution of δ, then their threshold for x will be higher. One possibility
is that consumers will only accept values of x that brings the distribution
of total gains – that is the gains from employment and from δ – closer to
the fair distribution. For example, suppose a fair distribution of the initial
gains from employment would have been an equal distribution, but the
actual distribution was a 70/30 split. Then firms’ capture of 70% or more
of δ would fail to bring the distribution of total gains closer to the fair
distribution. Thus, if the sole concern of consumers was that δ reduced the
gap between the actual distribution of gains from employment and the
distribution of gains from both that initial distribution and the transfer of
δ, then consumers would only continue to provide δ when firms captured
a proportion of δ that was closer to the fair distribution of initial gains than
the actual distribution of initial gains was.
In practice, consumers’ motivations are likely mixed. They will care
both about the proportion of δ that reaches workers and about workers’
total welfare. Repeated versions of the above game are very similar to
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ultimatum games. In an ultimatum game, player A offers B a particular
split of a surplus which B can either accept or reject. If B accepts, both
receive the payoffs proposed by A. If B rejects the offer, neither receives
anything. Firms’ choice of x in the above capture game is analogous to
A’s offer in an ultimatum game and consumers’ choice to either continue
providing δ or stop is analogous to B’s choice to either accept or reject.
A meta-analysis of studies involving ultimatum games found that, on
average, A offered 40% of the gains to B and B accepted 84% of offers
(Oosterbeek et al. 2004). Of course, the capture game differs somewhat
from the ultimatum game. It is played in a more complicated context
in which consumers’ interests are tied to a third party, workers; and, by
paying unfair initial wages, firms have already demonstrated strong self-
regarding behaviour. Nevertheless, we think it is reasonable to assume
consumers’ tolerance for capture – the value of x that allows the game to
continue – will be similar to values observed in ultimatum games.
This analysis assumes that a significant number of consumers choose
the compensatory option. If Alice alone made a compensatory transfer,
then the firm employing the worker receiving δ would be unlikely to
know she had done so – and even if they did, unlikely to attempt to
capture the single instance of δ. These informational asymmetries and
efficiency considerationsmean that firmswill not capture δ below a certain
uptake threshold. The lower the expected uptake of the compensatory
approach, the lower the probability that firms will capture a portion of
δ and the greater the expected efficacy of each individual transfer. The
upshot is that if consumer demand for fairly remunerated labour is high,
and if these motivations culminate in many compensatory transfers, then
firms’ capture of these transfers will undermine their effect on the relative
distribution of gains between firms and workers.
High demand not only erodes the efficacy of the compensatory option,
it also increases the palatability of two other actions, one performed
by firms, the other by consumers. First, if consumer demand for such
goods is indeed high, then firms would have an incentive to increase
wages, advertise this increase and pass the price of the wage hike on to
consumers while also increasing profits by retaining a portion of these
price increases.6 If ‘ethical’ consumers are sufficiently price insensitive,
firms may be able to profit more from this strategy than they would from
subsidy capture. Second, if demand is high, consumers have an incentive
to select the instinctive option as a form of boycott. If a boycott succeeds,
the short-term welfare loss to workers from a boycott may be offset by
subsequent wages that are higher and fairer. This brings us to the final
objection.
6 Firms might decide to do this for a subset of their products in order to retain consumers
who, because they lack a taste for fairness, are more price sensitive.
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3.4. What are the prospects for a boycott?
Here we assess what we think represents the most forceful argument
for the instinctive option: the claim that Alice should purchase the
US-produced t-shirt in order to signal a boycott of brands whose
supplier factories pay unfair wages. To boycott, in this context, is to
refrain from purchasing goods from suppliers who produce goods using
sweatshop labour until these suppliers change their practices. There are
two important questions to ask about this approach. The first is whether
the suggested boycott strategy will be effective. The second is whether it
is indeed morally superior to the compensatory option.
A successful boycott, like the compensatory option, is consistent with
the concern of fairness while promising not to undermine the welfare
gains at stake for workers in Bangladesh. If Alice purchases the US-made
t-shirt as part of a boycott of brands that rely on unfairly remunerated
labour, this ensures that the workers who produced her new t-shirt were
paid a fair wage. At the same time, by claiming that her action is part
of a boycott she signals that if the sweatshop producer increases wages
to fair levels she will purchase their product. The goal is to provide an
incentive for the brand with production in Bangladesh to ensure their
suppliers pay fair wages and to opt for its products in the future as soon as
it does.
While a boycott is similar to the compensatory option, the two differ
in two important ways. The first difference is that the success or failure of a
boycott does not depend on Alice’s actions alone. While Alice can be sure
that she brings about both welfare increases and unfairness mitigation
through the compensatory transfer, she cannot be sure that the boycott
will be successful.
The second, and related difference is that the boycott takes a high-risk,
high-reward approach to welfare gains. If Alice takes part in a boycott
and the boycott is successful, it will increase wages for all workers, for
all clothes they produce. The welfare gains from a compensatory transfer,
in contrast, will be far lower. Suppose, as an illustrative example, that
a sweatshop worker currently produces 100 shirts and is paid $3 per
day, but that a fair wage would be $30 per day. The difference between
the actual and fair compensation per shirt, δ, would then be $30100 − $3100 =
$0.27. The compensatory option would have Alice purchase the shirt
produced in the sweatshop and transfer an additional $0.27 to the worker.
This mitigates unfairness and results in welfare gain, though only about
one tenth of a day’s wages – and this is under the assumptions that
a fair wage is as high as $30 per day (and that the worker does not
produce more than 100 shirts). In reality this point is rather unlikely as
the fair wage, as it almost certainly lies beyond the reservation price of
the firm. The aggregate welfare gains from a successful boycott would
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be far greater. If the boycott succeeded in raising wages to fair levels,
then all workers would receive fair wages, not only for one shirt, but in
perpetuity.
On the other hand, the risks of a boycott are also substantial. While the
boycott is ongoing, consumer demand for sweatshop products is reduced.
If the boycott has any hope of succeeding, this reduction must negatively
affect firms’ profits, with a potential decrease in their demand for labour
for the duration of the boycott. If successful, boycotts, depending on how
quickly the affected brands respond to them, are likely to have some
temporary negative welfare effects in the originating country (in the form
of reduced demand) that will be outweighed by far greater gains down the
line. But if unsuccessful, these negative effects will not be offset by greater
gains. The pressing question for Alice, if she is considering the instinctive
option as a form of boycott, is what is the probability that the boycott will
be successful? And relatedly, what is the probability that her action will
contribute to the success of a boycott?
The answer to the second question, of course, depends on who exactly
‘Alice’ is. If Alice is a prominent public figure, her purchasing habits may
have a greater influence than those of the average citizen. In general,
though, we should assume Alice has a standard amount of influence
over the behaviour of her fellow consumers, which is to say, not a great
deal of influence. If there is nothing special about Alice’s influence, then
the first question is more important: what are the odds of a successful
boycott?
In general, the probability of a successful boycott is not high.
Numerous studies have found that the market effects of boycotts are
negligible (Ashenfelter et al. 2007; King 2008, 2011; McDonnell and King
2013) and even those generally perceived to have successfully impacted
their target’s financial position, such as boycotts of apartheid South
Africa, had little visible effect on the financial markets (Teoh et al. 1999).
In general, the reasons seem to be that while some boycotts attract a
great deal of media coverage, most have neither the amount of support
nor the number of committed activists that the media attention suggests.
Furthermore, as King notes, ‘There’s some research that suggests that even
consumers that are ideologically supportive of the boycott ... never bought
the product in the first place’ (King 2016). Thus, the financial pressure that
their boycotting brings is minimal. McDonnell and King (2013) find that
boycotts can be effective in altering firms’ reputations. However, they also
find that ‘many of firms’ ostensibly responsible actions and investments
may actually be defensive ... impression management tactics, rather than
concessions ... [t]he Walmarts and Nikes of the corporate world have
been so frequently targeted by activists that they have developed a fairly
sophisticated prosocial performance repertoire to combat those negative
claims’ (McDonnell and King 2013: 411–412).
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While boycotts are not likely to be successful, they may nevertheless
represent a morally attractive option when the costs of a failed boycott
are sufficiently low, the benefits of a successful boycott are sufficiently
high, or the probability of a successful boycott is sufficiently great.
These variables simply depend on the particulars of a given case. In
most cases, however, choosing the instinctive option as a means of
boycott will not represent a morally compelling option when compared
to the compensatory approach. This conclusion should not be taken to
extend to consumer activism in general. Social and political pressure
can lead to real changes in labour laws. But consumers may find
effective ways to exert this pressure while still pursuing the compensatory
option.
In the previous section we indicated that if consumer demand
for ‘ethical’ goods was high and if it led to a significant number of
compensatory transfers, then the compensatory option would be prone
to capture. The studies cited above indicate that such demand is low
and/or that consumers have difficulty coordinating and committing to
such behaviour.7 While this spells trouble for boycotts, it also shows that
it is unlikely that enough consumers will make compensatory transfers
for the kind of capture discussed in the previous section to represent a
real challenge to the strategy.
4. OBLIGATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
Our primary aim is to argue that the compensatory option ismorally better
than the alternative options. In showing that the four main challenges to
this claim fail, we have established that, in most cases, the compensatory
option is morally superior to the dismissive and instinctive options. This
evaluative conclusion does not imply the stronger, deontic claim that
consumers are obliged to provide compensation to workers. In this section
we consider whether (and why) consumers might be obliged to transfer δ
to workers. In the process we will also discuss how transfers of δ could be
practically implemented.
4.1. Obligations
It seems plausible that consumer obligations in the context of sweatshop
labour are conditional obligations. That is, while Alice is not obliged to
purchase either shirt, if she does purchase the sweatshop shirt, then she
is obliged to transfer δ to workers. There is a straightforward argument
supporting this obligation. When the gains from a transaction are unfairly
7 Note that some advocacy groups are attempting to modify consumer demand for these
products. For example, Fashion Revolution (2016) is an organization that seeks to increase
supply chain transparency.
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distributed between a firm and worker to the benefit of the firm, then the
firm is obliged to relinquish those gains which rightfully belong to the
worker. Furthermore, no transfer of the unfair gains from the firm to a
third party can be valid, since the firm itself has no valid claim to them.
Should the firm transfer these gains, the third party beneficiary has an
obligation to return them to the worker who has a valid claim to them. In
this sense, then, if a sweatshop underpays Bob by δ and passes this on to
Alice in the form of a δ reduction in the cost of clothing, Alice is obliged
to return δ to the worker. Unfortunately, this straightforward explanation
is threatened by three problems.
The first is that when only some of the benefits of unfairness are
passed on to consumers it is unclear why they are obliged to transfer the
full value of δ. Suppose the δ benefit is fully transferred to Alice. While
her return of δ to Bob mitigates the harm he experiences, it does not fully
rectify the wrong involved in the situation. The firm, acting as a ‘middle
man’ also commits a wrong by enabling the transfer. It seems plausible
that, qua ‘enablers’, firms too have some obligation to ensure the return of
δ to Bob – in the same way that both the recipient of stolen goods and the
thief have an obligation to return the goods to their rightful owner.
Just as firms can be complicit in enabling wrongful behaviour, so
too can consumers. Even if firms retain the full δ, their ability to extract
this benefit from workers depends on and occurs because of consumer
purchases. And just as firms qua enablers retain an obligation to ensure
the return of δ to workers even after it is transferred to consumers, so
too do consumers qua enablers retain an obligation when δ is retained
as profit for the firm.8 Of course, transferring δ on their own is not the
only way for consumers to discharge this obligation – they may petition
the firm to return it – but given the relatively low value of δ for each
consumer, making the transfer themselves is the most frictionless course
of action. Thus, consumers are obliged to ensure the return of δ not only
when they receive unfair benefits, but also because they are complicit in
enabling firms to unfairly profit.
The second problem concerns the identification of the wronged party.
If Alice cannot identify the worker that produced her shirt, then can the
transfer of δ to another worker fulfil her obligation? More generally, can
compensating A mitigate a wrong to B? By the ‘straightforward’ and
‘complicity’ arguments provided above, Alice’s obligation is grounded
in her complicity in the firms’ extraction of unfair gains and (when she
receives them) the benefits that are illegitimately passed on to her by the
company. Alice’s complicity creates the conditions in which non-specific
8 In practice, δ will likely be divided between the consumer and the firm, which means
the obligations of each are grounded both by their enabling of the unfair transfer and the
benefits they receive from it.
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members of a group are wronged and it seems that her obligations are
thus to this group. Alice can discharge her complicity-based obligation
by transferring δ to any member of this group (who has not already been
compensated by δ).
However, the identification problem may seem more pressing in the
case of obligations grounded in the benefits Alice receives. Consider a
case of theft. Suppose Bob steals $5 from Carol and gives the money to
Alice. Then by the ‘straightforward’ argument, since Alice has no right
to the money she is obliged to return it to Carol. Furthermore, Alice
cannot discharge the obligation to Carol by giving the money to a fourth,
unrelated party, Dennis. So, it appears that just as compensating Dennis
does not discharge Alice’s obligation to Carol, transferring δ to another
sweatshop worker does not discharge Alice’s benefit-based obligation to
the worker who made her shirt.
Now consider a second case in which both Carol and Dennis leave $5
bills on a table. Bob steals both bills and gives one to Alice. While Alice
knows she should return $5 to either Carol or Dennis, she does not know
whose money she received. Intuitively, in this variation, if Alice returns
$5 to one of the parties, then she has discharged her obligation. Yet this
conflicts with the prior conclusion that if the money was Carol’s, Alice
cannot discharge her obligation by giving it to Dennis. What accounts for
the difference?
First, in the second case, both Carol and Dennis suffer harms. Second,
these harms are identical and are the result of the same action type (but
not necessarily token) that produced a benefit for Alice. Third, none of
the parties knows whose money Alice received. When these features are
present in a context where Alice also has a complicity-based obligation to-
wards a particular group and in which the benefit Alice receives is derived
from a fungible good, Alice can discharge her benefit-based obligation by
returning the good from which she benefits to any member of the group
that has been harmed by actions of the type that benefitted her.
These factors mean that Alice does not need to identify and
compensate the individual who produced her shirt in order to fulfil
her obligations with respect to the purchase of the sweatshop-produced
t-shirt. This conclusion eases the implementation of a compensatory
transfer scheme.When all members of a group are underpaid and produce
the same t-shirts, Alice need only identify and compensate the relevant
group to whom she is obliged, presumably the workers employed by a
particular factory.
4.2. Implementation
This brings us to the final issue we consider: the practical implementation
of a compensatory transfer. There exist many ways to transfer δ from the
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consumer to the relevant group of workers. Here we discuss twomethods:
direct transfer and charitable donation. Each approach has advantages
and disadvantages related to the cost of transfers, identification of
beneficiaries and ease of uptake.
Direct transfers, albeit rare, are increasingly possible in developing
and low-income countries through the use of mobile phone banking.9
By directly transferring δ, consumers can transform any product into
a ‘fair trade analogue’ without the need for external certification and
they can do so independently of the behaviour of other consumers. The
direct transfer approach provides greater choice for morally motivated
consumers and enjoys the greatest ease of uptake – any interested
consumer can simply directly transfer δ. Challenges for the direct transfer
approach include the identification of beneficiaries and the cost of
the transfer. Even if, as we argued above, consumers can fulfil their
obligation to workers by transferring δ to a member of a group of
affected workers, consumers must have some basic understanding of who
produced their clothing. In some cases, the supply chain information
that is available to consumers is simply insufficient for consumers to
ensure that the beneficiaries of their transfer are those to whom they
have a complicity-based obligation. Nevertheless, there is some indication
that the garment industry is moving towards greater supply chain
transparency, in part due to pressure from advocacy groups such as
Fashion Revolution, which publishes a yearly ‘Fashion Transparency
Index’. A second challenge for the direct transfer approach concerns
the cost of transfer. High transfer costs may undermine consumers’
willingness to provide δ, though the development of mobile and inter-
national transfer platforms such as TransferWise10 significantly reduces
these costs.
The second form of implementation involves donating δ to a charity
or NGO working with persons involved in sweatshop labour. Transfer
costs to charities are low, but overhead costs vary. Some organizations
apply a high rate of donations to direct programming; others have less
efficient rates of conversion of donations into recipients’ benefits. Such
differences are important, since what matters, from the point of view of
fair compensation, is that at least δ reaches workers. If charity overheads
mean that amounts less than δ reach workers, there is a strong case
for claiming that consumers should transfer an amount sufficient to
ensure workers receive δ. As with direct transfers, this option depends
on consumers’ own initiative, so ease of uptake is not a significant hurdle.
9 Give Directly (givedirectly.org), is perhaps themost notable organization involved in direct
transfer, though transfers via Give Directly are not specifically linked to sweatshop labour.
10 TransferWise is a peer-to-peer transfer service that uses a Hawala-style transfer system.
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However, the primary challenge for the charity approach is in matching
the transfer of δ to affected groups.
5. CONCLUSION
We conclude that in most cases it is morally better for Alice to pursue
the compensatory option than either of the other two options. The
compensatory option promises to be superior to the dismissive option
by ensuring that the workers who produced her new t-shirt have been
compensated fairly; and superior to the instinctive option by contributing
to the realization of the greater welfare benefits associated with garment
jobs in Bangladesh. However, the compensatory option will not always be
morally better.
As far as a defence of the dismissive option is concerned, if a
case can be made for the claim that sweatshop workers are not paid
unfairly, then the dismissive and compensatory options coincide. And if
consumer demand for fairly produced goods is significant, then a portion
of compensatory transfers is likely to be captured by firms. In such a
scenario, the prospects for a boycott, and thus the instinctive option
look much better. However, we hope to have shown above that neither
of these scenarios is likely and for most consumers, in most cases, the
compensatory option is superior to the dismissive option.
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